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Abstract
We develop an economic geography model where mobile skilled workers choose to either
work in a production sector or to become part of an unproductive elite. The elite sets income
tax rates to maximize its own welfare by extracting rents, thereby inﬂuencing the spatial struc-
ture of the economy and changing the available range of consumption goods. We show that
either unskilled labor mobility, or rent-seeking behavior, or both, are likely to favor the oc-
curence of agglomeration and of urban primacy. In equilibrium, the elite may tax the unskilled
workers but does not tax the skilled workers, and there are rural-urban transfers towards the
agglomeration. The size of the elite and the magnitude of the tax burden that falls on the
unskilled decrease with product diﬀerentiation and with the expenditure share for manufactur-
ing goods. All these results are broadly in line with observed patterns of urban primacy and
economic development in sub-Saharan African countries.
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1“It seems to be the thinking that Africans obtain an education in order to enter the government
bureaucracy so as to be able to share the wealth of the nation rather than create wealth for the
nation.” (Bassey, 1999, p.106)
1 Introduction
During the last ﬁfty years, cities in the developing world have grown tremendously.1 Changing
demographic trends – the persistence of high fertility coupled with declining mortality – have allowed
cities of developing countries to maintain high population growth rates in spite of a challenging
economic environment. Nowhere is this dilemma more visible than in the congested cities of sub-
Saharan Africa (henceforth, ssa), where projections of urban population growth remain the highest
despite the poor economic performance of the countries in that region. Since 1950, the urban growth
rates in ssa are among the highest in the world – it is since 1995 the only region that still has an
urban growth rate exceeding 3% (United Nations, 2006). Such rapid urban population growth
raises serious concerns about the ability of African cities to deal economically, environmentally, and
politically with such concentrations of people. The poor economic performance of these countries,
when coupled with their strong urban growth, also seems to back the claim that, throughout history,
urbanization played a lesser role in the economic development of the developing world than in that
of now developed countries (Bairoch, 1985; De Long and Shleifer, 1993).
Several explanations have been put forward to explain the urban growth spurt in ssa. On the
one hand, there are push factors linked to rural population growth, environmental degradation,
climate change (Barrios et al., 2006), and armed civil conﬂicts (Lozano-Garcia et al., 2010). On
the other hand, there are pull factors which are essentially linked to the attraction exerted by
higher incomes and productivity, as well as a larger range of available goods and services, in the
urban centers on rural migrants. Productivity improvements and higher incomes may stem from
agglomeration economies arising from the diversity of intermediate goods, the matching process
in the local labor market, from knowledge spillovers across ﬁrms, or any combination of these.
There is an extensive literature on the mechanisms that generate aggregate increasing returns to
scale at the urban level (see Duranton and Puga, 2004; Fujita and Thisse, 2002). While evidence
for agglomeration economies in developed countries and in Asia is fairly well documented, this
is not the case for ssa. Yet, agglomeration economies may play an important role in African
urban development. According to McGranahan et al. (2009), careful analyses of the relationship
1While some 309 million inhabitants were living in cities of developing countries in 1950 – 42% of a total urban
population evaluated at 732 million – the world’s urban population had reached 3.15 billion by 2005, with 71.5% of
inhabitants (2.25 billion) living in the cities of developing countries (United Nations, 2006). In 2005, less-developed
countries were host to 12 of the 15 largest cities in the world, with a combined population exceeding 277 million.
2between economic change and urbanization show that in Africa, as elsewhere, urbanization has
been associated with economic growth. The potential role that African cities might play in the
development of their continent is even clearly praised in the 2009 World Development report which
claims that “urbanization, done right, can help development more in Africa than elsewhere” (World
Bank, 2008, p.285) .
Agglomeration economies and the concepts of density, distance, and division are key to the
spatial dimension of economic development and the leading role of cities. These points suggest why
economic progress in Africa has been slow compared to other regions in the world: Africa is badly
aﬀected by low density, long distances, and deep divisions (World Bank, 2008). Collier (2006) asserts
that agglomeration economies in ssa are less important than those in Asia and in oecd countries.
Indeed, because countries in that region are too small and not integrated enough, many African cities
tend to be too small compared to the optimum. As shown by Au and Henderson (2006) for the
case of Asia, this may have serious impacts in terms of foregone growth. Research on agglomeration
economies and international competitiveness further suggests that late-comers to industrialization,
such as Africa’s natural resource exporters, face a disadvantage linked to the spatial distribution of
the global industry (Page, 2008).
As the overall productivity of sub-Saharan Africa is fairly low compared to international stan-
dards, the economic drive does not seem that important in explaining city growth in that region.
Indeed, the economic content of African cities “lacks the dynamism, specialisation, diversity and
economies of scale normally associated with urban life” (Bryceson and Potts, 2006). Hence, comple-
mentary explanations are required to understand the urban growth spurt occuring in that region.
One cause for Africa’s rapid urban growth may be the political role of its primate cities. The lo-
cation of the central administrations in African primate cities has favored their development well
beyond what is economically feasible and expected. The extent of the bureaucracy is often the most
characteristic aspect of city development in ssa. Employment is predominantly generated in the
government sector and parastatals (Bryceson and Potts, 2006). Twenty-one out of the 27 African
cities belonging to the 100 largest cities in the world that had the fastest population growth be-
tween 1950 and 2000 are capitals. They are the principal location of state administration and public
entreprises. The preponderant share of capitals among large and fast growing cities is an African
speciﬁcity. Indeed, this ratio is much lower in other regions of the world — 10 out of 34 in Asia, 4
out of 21 in Latin America & Carribean, and 0 out of 4 in North America (Satterthwaite, 2005).
The dominant role of capitals within the national urban hierarchy is further strengthened by
the fact that a disproportionate part of the national budget is spent within them – which explains
why they are usually the subject of massive in-migration by those seeking economic and political
opportunities not available elsewhere. This is where African political economy kicks in: political
leaders allocate a potentially economically indefensible share of resources to primate cities to satisfy
3the urban mob because they fear the pressure of city elites (Lipton, 1983; Bairoch, 1985). Spatial
proximity is likely to increase political inﬂuence in non-democratic countries since the leadership is
more sensitive to the claims of the urban elites than to those of people living in the country-side.
Hence, as empirically shown by Ades and Glaeser (1995), politics directly aﬀects urban concentration
as rent-seeking agents have to be spatially close to the political power. The rents they reap, together
with the government’s net transfer of resources from the country-side to the cities to run the state,
further raise city population by attracting economic activity to the main centers of purchasing
power.2 The net result is that still more population is attracted by these transfers, which draw
ressources from the hinterland and make cities in the developing world absorb a disproportionate
fraction of overall economic activity. Eventually, the process becomes self-reinforcing and leads to
the formation of large urbanized core regions, as emphasized by the new economic geography (see
Fujita et al., 1999; Fujita and Thisse, 2002; Baldwin et al., 2003).
The agglomeration process described in the foregoing highlights that economical, political, and
spatial factors should be jointly taken into consideration when analyzing the formation of large ur-
ban agglomerations in the developing world.3 Stated diﬀerently, political rent-seeking, rural-urban
transfers, migration, increasing returns, and geography should be important ingredients of the whole
story. The main objective of this paper is to present a new economic geography (henceforth, neg)
framework that combines these ingredients to shed some light on agglomeration, regional imbalances,
and urban primacy in developing countries. Although the neg literature has been rapidly growing
these last years there are, to the best of our knowledge, only few contributions dealing with political
factors. Robert-Nicoud and Sbergami (2004) present a model that analyzes the impacts of political
factors, increasing returns, and economic integration on agglomeration. Their main objective is to
explain how and why the regional integration process of the European Union leads to important
transfers of resources from the ‘core regions’ to the ‘peripheral regions’. Using a probabilistic vot-
ing model, the authors endogenize regional policy and transfers that are determined by the swing
voters of the ideologically most homogeneous group. As the latter is predominantly located in the
country-side, the peripheral regions can obtain transfers because of their relative political homo-
geneity. By contrast, the large region will keep the ‘core’ only if its relative economic size overcomes
its political weakness due to ideological fragmentation. Robert-Nicoud and Sbergami’s (2004) main
result, namely that the political process leads to a more even distribution of economic activity than
2Similar mechanisms, leading to the formation of ‘parasite cities’ due to the transfers of resources, have already
been vividly depicted by Cantillon (1730, ch. I.V, in paragraph I.V.2) and Bairoch (1985). As shown by Dascher
(2000), income transfers which violate Ohlson’s principle of ‘ﬁscal equivalence’ also seem to play a role in explaining
the growth of regional capitals in Germany. The key idea is, as always, the breaking of the tax-beneﬁts link.
3Kanbur and Venables (2003, p.473) clearly emphasize this aspect by asking the question: “To what extent are
inequalities due to lumpiness in infrastructure investments, to industrial agglomeration forces, or to political economy
factors that bias policy to selected regions?”
4the market mechanism, is quite opposite to what we seem to observe in many developing countries,
namely transfers of resources from the hinterland to the cities, which increases agglomeration. Fur-
thermore, a democratic process, as embodied in the probabilistic voting model, does not adequately
characterize the political environment of many developing countries, especially in regions like ssa.
We thus propose an alternative model in which the ‘political process’ consists in agents deciding on
whether or not to enter a political elite in order to extract rents to maximize their own welfare. In
such a setting, rent-seeking leads to rural-urban transfers that exacerbate regional imbalances, thus
showing that the nature of the political process matters for the direction of net transfers and the
degree of agglomeration. This illustrates that “when farmers form a majority of the population, they
tend to subsidize the urban minority. When farmers form a minority, the urban majority subsidizes
them” (Friedman, as quoted by Mbeki, 2005, p.5).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents some facts about urban
primacy, regional income transfers, and corruption in sub-Saharan Africa. In Section 3, we develop
the model and discuss the market outcome. Section 4 then investigates the spatial equilibrium
and shows that rural-urban transfers make the emergence of agglomeration more likely. Section 5
deals with the issues of elite formation and tax setting, and derives the equilibrium taxes and the
equilibrium size of the elite. Section 6 concludes.
2 Some facts about urbanization in SSA
The urbanization process in ssa has led to a major population redistribution between rural and
urban areas. Even among the urban centers, this redistribution has been very skewed towards
the very large cities and metropolitan regions (Mabogunje, 1994). ssa countries have, as a result,
become increasingly aﬀected by regional imbalances and urban primacy.4
Insert Table 1 about here.
Table 1 illustrates the prevalence of urban primacy in ssa. As one can see, there are only few
countries in that region with primacy levels below 15% – South Africa and Nigeria being among those
few. While South Africa, with its comparatively high level of economic development, is characterized
by a more balanced urban system, Nigeria departs from the typical regional pattern because its large
population is hardly compatible with the existence of a single primate city. We can further see from
Table 1 that while primacy is typical of small countries like Gambia, Burundi, Rwanda and Togo,
4Urban primacy can be measured in a variety of ways, e.g., as the proportion of urban population living in the
largest city or as the ratio of the largest city population to the second-largest city population. The largest city is usually
considered as being a ‘primate city’ if it has a population that exceeds twice the population of the second-largest city,
i.e., if it deviates from the rank-size rule.
5where the capitals dominate the economic landscape, it is also characteristic of larger countries like
Gabon, Angola, Congo, Ivory Coast, and Senegal.
Another noteworthy feature is that the biggest cities in Africa experienced the fastest growth
rates. The share of ssa urban population living in cities of more than 500,000 inhabitants rose
from 6% to 41% between 1960 and 1980, and the number of such centers increased from 3 to 28.5
Moreover, the number of agglomerations with at least one million inhabitants jumped from 2 in 1950
to 21 in 1990 (Max Miller and Singh, 1994). Smaller cities grew at a much slower pace. According
to the United Nations (2002), while the average population growth rate of cities with fewer than
500,000 inhabitants was of 3.8%, those of cities with between one and ﬁve million inhabitants and
of cities with more than ﬁve million inhabitants were of 6.67% and 5.35%, respectively.
Insert Table 2 about here.
How does ssa compare to other regions in the world? To answer this question tentatively, we
isolate some stylized facts on urban primacy based on a descriptive analysis of a cross-section of 164
countries (see Appendix B for more details on variables and data sources). The data suggest that
rent-seeking and interregional income transfers may be drivers for urban primacy in ssa countries.
Table 2 provides some summary statistics for the full sample. As one can see, there is a large degree
of variation in all variables, including urban primacy as measured by either the share of the urban
population living in the largest city, or by the ratio of the largest to the second-largest city.
Insert Table 2 about here.
Table 2 also contrasts the full sample with the ssa subsample. At ﬁrst sight, it suggests that
there is a pattern speciﬁc to ssa countries. Indeed, these countries seem to have larger primate
cities (as measured either by the urban population in the largest city or the ratio of the largest
to the second-largest city), seem to be more corrupt, have a larger food expenditure share, and a
bigger shadow economy than the other countries in the sample. Furthermore, top tax rates, both
for personal and for corporate income, also seem to be higher in those countries. To get a clearer
idea on ssa’s speciﬁcity, we also compare in Table 2 the ssa subsample with the subsample of
‘Other Low and Middle income Countries’ (olm).6 ssa countries have higher top tax rates, higher
‘central government expenditures on goods, services, and compensation of employees’, larger shadow
economies and higher food expenditure shares than the olm countries. They are also characterized
by a higher share of the urban population living in the largest city, and a lower non-corruption
index, though the diﬀerence is relatively small. Observe that olm countries have a higher ratio of
5World Bank (1989) Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth - A Long Term Perspective Study.
Washington D.C.: World Bank (as quoted by Mabogunje, 1994).
6The deﬁnion and classiﬁcation of olm countries is taken from the January 2011 World Bank Countries Classiﬁ-
cation (available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/CLASS.XLS). We also use
standard World Bank deﬁnitions to classify other groups of countries (e.g., Industrial Countries).
6the largest to the second-largest city than ssa countries. Therefore, ssa countries are not those with
the strongest imbalances between the largest and the second largest cities. However, their higher
average urban primacy suggests that ssa is the region where the overall distribution of the urban
population is the most skewed towards primate cities.
Insert Table 3 about here.
Since the full sample and the olm subsample include countries from diﬀerent continents (and
also at various development stages), there is a great deal of heterogeneity. This prompts for a more
detailed comparison between ssa and other groups of countries. According to the mean comparision
tests summarized in Table 3, ssa countries have a signiﬁcantly larger urban primacy (at the 5%
conﬁdence level) than Industrial nations and countries from Middle East & North Africa, East Asia,
and South Asia & Paciﬁc. However, there is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence, at the 5% conﬁdence level,
between ssa and Latin America & Caribbean countries. Put diﬀerently, ssa does not outperform
Latin America & Caribbean, a region well known for its substantial spatial imbalances and urban
concentration, in that dimension.
Mean comparison tests on the non-corruption index and on central government expenditures on
goods, services and compensation of employees, also reveal that ssa diﬀers along other fundamental
dimensions from the remaining developing countries in the sample. Indeed, given that its average
non-corruption index is signiﬁcantly lower than in any other region of the world – except East Asia,
and South Asia & Paciﬁc – ssa stands out as one of the regions with the highest degree of corruption.
Furthermore, central governement expenditures on goods, services and compensation of employees
are signiﬁcantly higher in ssa than in any other region of the world, expect Middle East & North
Africa. If these expenditures are mostly ﬁnanced by general taxes, yet spent locally in large cities
under the form of administrative payrolls, they would lead to more rent-seeking and imply a regional
redistribution of purchasing power that may drive the agglomeration of mobile ﬁrms and workers,
thereby leading to the formation of large urban centers.7
Insert Table 4 about here.
The results of the mean comparison tests are consistent with the results given by an analysis
of the pairwise correlation matrix. As can be seen from Table 4, the non-corruption index and
GDP per capita are quite naturally strongly and positively correlated, thus implying that highly
corrupt countries rank among the poorest in the world. Furthermore, GDP per capita is signiﬁcantly
negatively correlated with central government expenditures on goods, services, and compensation of
7Unfortunately, we have no information on how and where tax revenues are levied and on how and where they are
ultimately spent in developing countries. It is, therefore, not possible to directly link central government expenditures
on goods, services, and compensation of employees, to spendings in major urban areas (though we think this may be
quite highly correlated).
7employees. In other words, countries with high shares of central government expenditures on goods,
services, and compensation of employees are, therefore, among those with the weakest economies.
Insert Figure 1 about here.
Table 4 and Figure 1 reveal that urban primacy is signiﬁcantly correlated with central government
expenditures and with corruption. Put diﬀerently, corrupt countries with large central government
expenditures on goods, services, and compensation of employees, generally have larger primate
cities than the remaining countries. As can be further seen from Figure 1, ssa countries (depicted
in red) are more strongly aﬀected by these two factors. Hence, more corruption and larger central
government expenditures are more strongly associated with urban primacy in ssa countries than in
other parts of the world.8
To further assess the link between urban primacy and corruption in a multivariate regression
setting with more controls, we also make use of panel data. Our econometric model that follows is
essentially based on Davis and Henderson (2003), who derived their speciﬁcation from a theoretical
framework modeling rural-urban allocation and primacy. We estimate the following speciﬁcation:
primacyit = β0 ln(urban population)it + β1 [ln(urban population)it]
2 (1)
+β3 ln(GDPpc)it + β4 [ln(GDPpc)it]
2 + β5 Xit + β6 Zi + δt + ξit
Observations are in ﬁve-year intervals from 1980 to 2005 for a panel of countries (see the Appendix
for details). As explanatory variables, we ﬁrstly include national urban population and GDP per
capita (adjusted for purchasing power parity, PPP). Those variables are inserted in quadratic form
to account for non-linearities.9 The Xit covariate is an institutional variable on political regimes.
Indeed, some speciﬁc political institutions may mitigate overconcentration. For instance, democracy
may allow the hinterland to have more inﬂuence in the political game (Davis and Henderson, 2003).
Zi denotes time-invariant covariates.10 In this category, we have data on transportation infrastruc-
ture: waterways per km2, railways per km2, roadways per km2. We also include an index of quality
8The relationship between ‘central governement expenditures on goods, services and compensation of employees’
and urban primacy appears only slightly stronger for the ssa subsample. This is strongly driven by Uganda (point
UGA in Figure 1), which is a leverage point of the regression. Without Uganda, the correlation becomes much
stronger (from 0.43 to 0.68) and the slope larger (from 0.52 to 1.31) for the ssa subsample.
9For the speciﬁc case of GDP per capita, the principal economic rationale behind the non-linearity assumption is
the so-called ‘Williamson eﬀect’. According to Williamson (1965), urban primacy ﬁrst rises with economic growth and
then declines. At the outset of economic progess, a high degree of urban concentration may be viewed as necessary
since it enables the economy to make an eﬃcient use of infrastructure and managerial resources. Nevertheless, as the
economy keeps on growing, deconcentration ﬁnally occurs since the economy may now spread economic infrastructure
and knowledge resources to the country-side.
10We also include in this category time-varying covariates for which we do not have enough information over the
considered time span. Such covariates are generally averaged over the period in which their data are available.
8of the road network: the share of kilometers of roadways that are paved. The vector of time-invariant
variables also includes data on the land area of each country, on religion (percentage of Catholics,
Protestants and Muslims), on ethnolinguistic fractionalization, and dummies indicating whether the
primate city of a country is a capital, a port or whether a country is landlocked. Eventually, our most
interesting time-invariant variable is the non-corruption index. We add to this corruption measure
an interaction term of the non-corruption index with a dummy for ssa countries. This interaction
variable will allow us to assess whether corruption aﬀects primacy diﬀerently in ssa countries than
in other countries.11 Finally, the δt control for time shocks/trends that are common across countries.
Two comments are in order. First, Equation (1) does not explicitly include ﬁxed eﬀects because
their presence would entail an identiﬁcation issue for the time-invariant variables. However, since
country ﬁxed eﬀects allow to control for unobserved cross-country time-invariant factors that may
impact urban primacy, it is important to include them (Davis and Henderson, 2003). In Appendix C,
we present a method that allows to estimate consistently time-invariant variables in a panel setting
with ﬁxed eﬀects. Second, speciﬁcation (1) is prone to endogeneity issues as discussed at length in
Davis and Henderson (2003). We also describe in Appendix C the two-step procedure that allows
to obtain consistent 3SLS estimates of time-varying variables.
Insert Table 5 about here.
Table 5 presents estimation results for equation (1). Column (1) gives pooled OLS results with
time-invariant covariates. The only time-varying covariate coeﬃcient that is signiﬁcant is the co-
eﬃcient of the log of urban population. It is negative as expected: a greater urban scale entails
that the economy can support more cities, reducing the population share of each of them. Column
(1) yields other interesting results: primacy increases with the capital city dummy, which suggests
that the extent of bureaucracy allows capital cities to achieve higher size than other primate cities.
Urban primacy also decreases with the landlocked dummy. This supports the claim that long dis-
tances, deep divisions, and poor integration of transportation systems badly aﬀect the size of African
primate cities (Collier, 2006; World Bank, 2008). Results regarding the impact of transportation
infrastructure are informative as well. While primacy is unaﬀected by the railways and waterways
densities, it is positively aﬀected by the density of roadways. However, it decreases with the share
of paved roads. In words, a larger stock of roads raises urban primacy, but the higher the quality of
11Countries endowed with a substantial high-quality transportation infrastructure are less likely to concentrate their
ressources in just one city. Large countries are also more likely to spread their urban population across several cities.
Moreover, we may conjecture that if the primate city in a country is a port, its size will be larger due to the transport
hub eﬀect (Fujita and Mori, 1996; Davis and Henderson, 2003). We previously mentioned that political economy in
ssa favors the development of capital cities well beyond economic lines. This suggests that in case the biggest city
of a country is a capital, its size will be larger as well. Finally, many authors attribute regional eﬀects to cultural
diﬀerences. We control these eﬀects with measures of ethnic and cultural heterogeneity and religious aﬃliations.
9the roadways network, the lower the increase in urban primacy.
One may also notice that, in the pooled OLS regression, the non-corruption index has a positive
and signiﬁcant impact on urban primacy. Its interaction term with the ssa dummy is negative,
however, thus suggesting that there is a ssa-speciﬁc eﬀect. Since the balance of the two terms is
negative (-0.0016), more corrupt ssa countries have higher urban primacy.
Our pooled OLS estimates are prone to two kinds of problems: the ﬁrst one is the neglect of
unobserved heterogeneity, and the second is endogeneity. To mitigate the ﬁrst issue, we present ﬁxed
eﬀects estimates in column (2). time-invariant regressors, estimated in a second step, are displayed
in blue. Concerning time-varying covariates, the estimated coeﬃcients of urban population and its
square suggest that primacy varies non-monotonically with urban population. However, primacy
declines with urban population throughout the sample range of the urban population variable.12
Observe that most of the ﬁxed eﬀects results for time-invariant covariates are in line with pooled
OLS estimates: primacy increases with the capital dummy, and decreases with the share of paved
roads. Moreover, urban primacy increases signiﬁcantly with the non-corruption index but declines
with the interaction term. As with pooled OLS, the balance of the two terms is negative (-0.0014).
Conversely to pooled OLS results, the ﬁxed eﬀects estimate of the landlocked dummy is no longer
signiﬁcant. Moreover, urban primacy now declines signiﬁcantly with the logarithm of land area.
Fixed eﬀects estimation implies a substantial loss of degrees of freedom due to the inclusion
of country dummies. Multivariate regression estimates from the ﬁrst diﬀerence of (1) allows to
mitigate that issue and to obtain more eﬃcient estimates. Column (3) gives results for this regression
procedure. It shows that primacy declines with urban population throughout the sample range of
the urban population variable. It also indicates that primacy increases as income rises, peaks, and
then declines. The peak is at an income of about 2120 US$, in line with the Williamson hypothesis.
Concerning the road infrastructures covariates, we ﬁnd the same kind of results in column (3) than in
the pooled OLS speciﬁcation (1): primacy decreases with the share of paved roads while it increases
with roadways density. Findings concerning the capital city dummy are similar to previous ones,
conﬁrming that being the seat of central administration and of political institutions increases the
size of primate cities. Results pertaining to the political institutions variables are also similar to
those of columns (1) and (2): the non-corruption index and the interaction term have opposite signs,
with the same negative balance as in column (2).
Our 3SLS estimates in colums (4) and (5) allow for the handling of endogeneity. They yield
coeﬃcients of the ln(urban population) and square of ln(urban population) that have higher absolute
values than in previous ﬁndings. Concerning time-invariant covariates, most of the results in column
12In column (2), the minimum of the curve is attained at ln(urban population) = 0.1731/(2 ∗ 0.0040) = 21.64.
This implies a minimum value of urban population of more than two billion. Since such a value is clearly far beyond
our sample range, primacy is monotonically decreasing with urban population.
10(4) are in line with previous results. Yet, small diﬀerences can be noticed: the interaction of
primacy with the ssa dummy is still negative, as in previous results, but the coeﬃcient of the non-
corruption index is no longer signiﬁcant. Hence, corruption favors urban primacy in ssa, whereas it
has apparently no signiﬁcant impact in other regions of the world. In column (5), we ﬁnally add the
current value of the democracy index as a time-varying covariate. We obtain a negative coeﬃcient
that is signiﬁcant at the 10% level. This suggests that the less democratic a country is, the higher its
primacy. As indicated in Table 6, ssa countries are more autocratic than countries in other regions
or groupings, except those of Middle East & North Africa. This further drives up average urban
primacy in ssa.
To sum up, both our descriptive analysis and our panel data analysis suggest that corruption,
autocracy, landlockedness and central administration in capital cities raise urban primacy in ssa
countries. Therefore, even if there is no strong speciﬁcity in observed urban primacy in ssa, this
primacy may stem from other factors than in the rest of the developing world: high corruption
which leads to a redistribution of purchasing power from the country-side to the cities, where it
is spent by an essentially unproductive elite. With the highest corruption levels and the largest
central governement expenditures on goods, services, and compensation of employees, ssa may be
the developing region where politics has the strongest impact on regional imbalances and primacy.
In what follows, we propose a ‘simple model of economic geography’ that captures these features.
3 The model
We extend the analytically solvable neg model of Forslid and Ottaviano (2003) to formalize the
interactions between an elite (‘corruption’), the redistribution of purchasing power across regions
(‘interregional income transfers’), and agglomeration (‘urban primacy’). We consider a country with
two regions, labeled 1 and 2. Variables associated with each region will be subscripted accordingly.
The population consists of exogenously given masses U of unskilled and S of skilled workers. All
workers are geographically mobile. The skilled may be either production workers or part of an
unproductive elite — on top of being geographically mobile they are thus also socially mobile. The
unskilled are socially immobile and are always production workers. Yet, contrary to the skilled, they
can choose between working in the formal or in the informal sector of the economy (e.g., because
they are harder to monitor and to tax than the skilled).13 All agents spend their incomes locally and
13We assume that the unskilled cannot become skilled. Adding this possibility is formally equivalent to endogenizing
the wage elasticity of labor supply from agriculture to manufacturing (Puga, 1998). This in turn is equivalent to
allowing the geographically mobile population to increase, which would only reinforce our agglomeration results. We
also assume, for simplicity, that the total population is ﬁxed. Yet, one should keep in mind that strong population
growth and the associated pressure on scarce resources in the countryside are important factors to explain why large
streams of migrants are ‘pushed’ from rural areas to cities. Adding such considerations would, again, reinforce our
11work in the region they live in. In what follows, we denote by S the mass of skilled in the production
sector and by E the mass of unproductive skilled constituting the political elite. Both S and E are
endogenously determined, with S + E = S. We denote by 0 ≤ λS ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ λU ≤ 1 the share of
productive skilled S and unskilled workers U living in region 1. We assume that the political elite is
clustered into a historically determined center of power, which we henceforth refer to as the capital
of the country (e.g., the historical capital). We do not attempt to endogenously determine where
this center is located. Although this is an interesting question, it is secondary to the aspects we are
interested in. While skilled workers are thus a priori mobile across regions, they become de facto
immobile if they want to be part of the elite. In other words, social mobility of the skilled can only
occur in the capital and once they are part of the elite they become regionally immobile.14 Without
loss of generality, we assume that region 1 is the capital. Our model may be viewed as a game with
four stages: (i) the elite sets the tax rates tU and tS for the unskilled and the skilled; (ii) skilled
workers decide whether or not to enter the elite; (iii) skilled production workers choose the region
they live and work in; (iv) ﬁrms maximize proﬁts, and production and consumption takes place. We
solve that game by backward induction.15
3.1 Preferences
A representative consumer in region i = 1,2 (whether he belongs to the skilled, to the unskilled,
or to the elite) has Cobb-Douglas upper-tier preferences over agricultural and manufactured goods,
with a ces sub-utility over a continuum of horizontally diﬀerentiated varieties. Formally, he solves




























14In many countries, the political elite is strongly clustered and its location is very immobile spatially (China is an
example). Observe, however, that this does not preclude that the people constituting the elite are initially spatially
mobile and come from faraway places to the centers of power.
15As usual, the timing of the game is potentially important for the equilibrium. We could, e.g., consider the case in
which tax setting and the formation of the elite take place simultaneously. Yet, we believe that our timing is natural
since for agents to decide on tax rates they must already have chosen to be part of the elite. Furthermore, since our
game is one-shot, we disregard the fact that the elite wants to remain the elite in the long run.
16As correctly pointed out by a referee, the assumption that the skilled, the unskilled and the elite have identical
preferences is a strong one. We could relax it by assuming that the expenditure share on diﬀerentiated goods is higher
for the skilled and the elite. Doing so would reinforce the agglomeration tendencies in our model, however at the
expense of much heavier notation and algebra.
12where Ai is the consumption of agricultural good; qji(ω) and pji(ω) stand for the consumption and
the price of variety ω in region i when it is produced in region j; Ωi stands for the set of varieties
produced in region i, with measure ni; yi stands for the agent’s income, which depends on the social
group he belongs to (skilled, unskilled, or elite); and 0 < µ < 1, and σ > 1 are parameters. Since
preferences are homothetic, we obtain the following aggregate demand for ﬁrm ω in region i when







where Yi is the total income of agents in region i = 1,2 and Pi is the ces price index. We assume
that all varieties produced in the same region are symmetric, which allows us to simplify notation












3.2 Technology, taxes, and transportation
There are two production factors, skilled and unskilled labor, and two sectors, manufacturing and
agriculture. The agricultural sector produces a homogeneous good using unskilled labor only. We
assume that this good is tradable costlessly across regions. Without loss of generality, we normalize
the unit input coeﬃcient in that sector to one. Perfect competition and costless trade then imply
that the unskilled wages wU are equalized across regions: wU
1 = wU
2 = pU = 1, where the last equality
comes from our choice of num´ eraire.17 All unskilled workers are a priori free to work in agriculture
or in manufacturing. Hence, the wages for unskilled in the two sectors will be equalized.
Skilled workers can choose to remain in the production sector to earn a wage wi in region i, or
to get involved in politics and become part of the elite in the capital. The beneﬁt of belonging to
the elite is to participate in running the country and to extract rents for personal consumption. The
elite determines the tax rates for the diﬀerent groups of agents. To keep things simple, we suppose
that the elite levies proportional income tax rates tS and tU on the incomes of skilled and unskilled
workers in the manufacturing sector.18 The agricultural sector is assumed to be informal and untaxed
because it is hard to monitor. The unskilled hence face the choice of working either in the formal
manufacturing sector and to pay taxes, or to work in the agricultural shadow economy, hence evading
17Strictly speaking, such factor price equalization only holds when the mass of unskilled workers is large enough
for some agricultural production to take place in both regions at equilibrium. In what follows, we assume that this
condition holds (formally, µ must be small compared to σ; see Forslid and Ottaviano, 2003). More precisely, we
consider that µ < σ − 1.
18Since tax revenue is spent entirely unproductively by the elite, we may view 1 − tS and 1 − tU as proxies for the
‘degree of property rights enforcement’ for skilled and unskilled workers, respectively (Ades, 1995).
13taxation. Put diﬀerently, the unskilled tax base is not perfectly inelastic but generally shrinks with
the level tU of taxation. This observation ﬁts well with the empirical fact that all African countries
have large shadow economies (ﬁscal evasion seems to be fairly easy due to the lack of enforcement).
Recent estimates using a sample of 37 African countries indeed reveal that the average share of the
shadow economy is about 43.2% of GDP (Schneider, 2004, Figure 3.1.1). The skilled do not work
in the shadow economy and can thus evade taxation only by becoming part of the elite.
Manufacturing ﬁrms produce varieties of a horizontally diﬀerentiated consumption good using
both skilled and unskilled labor. More precisely, each ﬁrm requires F units of skilled labor as a ﬁxed
input requirement and m units of unskilled labor per unit of output as a variable input requirement.
The unskilled are willing to work in the formal sector if and only if their net income is equal to the
one they can secure in the informal sector, which implies that ﬁrms have to pay 1/(1−tU) per unit
of unskilled labor. Hence taxing the unskilled raises ﬁrms’ production costs because workers have
the outside option of the shadow economy. Total production costs for producing a quantity Xi in
region i = 1,2 are then given by
TCi(Xi) =
m
1 − tU Xi + Fwi,
where wi stands for the skilled wage in region i and where we have used wU ≡ 1. Given the ﬁxed
labor requirement, skilled labor market clearing then requires that the masses of ﬁrms in the two








To ship one unit of any variety between the two regions entails an iceberg trade cost of τ > 1.














where the demands are evaluated at (2). Since those demands are isoelastic, the proﬁt-maximizing










(σ − 1)(1 − tU)
.
Substituting these prices into (3), letting φ ≡ τ1−σ stand for the freeness of trade between the two




























14Note that, contrary to other neg models (Krugman, 1991; Ottaviano et al., 2002) where the total
mass of varieties is proportional to the exogenously ﬁxed population and the price index only changes
with the spatial distribution of that population, there are two ‘price index eﬀects’ in our model:
• for any given value of S, the price index in a region decreases with the share of ﬁrms located
in that region (‘regional market crowding eﬀect’); and
• for any given distribution of ﬁrms, the price indices in both regions decrease with the mass S
of productive skilled workers (‘global market crowding eﬀect’).
This second eﬀect, which implies that a smaller mass of productive skilled workers decreases welfare
by reducing product diversity and by increasing consumer prices, will be important in the subsequent
analysis of the elite’s behaviour.
Product market clearing for each variety requires that a ﬁrm located in region i produces the
total quantity
Xi = Dii + τDij =










Since ﬁrms price above marginal cost, there exist pure operating proﬁts which are competed away
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λS + φ(1 − λS)
+
Y2
φλS + (1 − λS)
 
. (9)
3.3 Rent-seeking and elite formation
As stated before, skilled workers can only evade taxation by becoming part of the elite. When they
do so, they spend their time in an ‘unproductive’ way which de facto reduces the amount of skilled
labor available for the production of diﬀerentiated varieties. Although this is a strong assumption
it partly captures the fact that, in many African countries, political participation essentially stems
from a rent-seeking motive, which is time intensive (e.g., because of lobbying) and therefore reduces
the productive labor supply of agents involved in this kind of activity. A skilled worker will become
a member of the elite if and only if the rent he can secure from doing so exceeds the skilled wage
15he can secure in the production sector.19 Formally, a skilled worker will enter the elite if his rent r
exceeds (1 − tS)wi, where the rent satisﬁes
rE ≡ m[n1X1 + n2X2]
tU
1 − tU + S
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Sw1 + (1 − λ
S)w2], (10)
the right-hand side being the elite’s total tax revenue. Note that we assume, for simplicity, that the
elite does spend all the tax revenue unproductively. This captures the idea that “in those African
countries in which corruption has become quite pervasive, the cost of public goods and services is
highly inﬂated, usually to provide additional income for the individuals whose job it is to serve the
public” (Mbaku, 2003, p.317). Adding some partial tax spending on the provision of public goods
and services is not likely to weaken our results if this spending is largely allocated to cities and
ﬁnanced from general taxes instead of speciﬁc urban ones.
3.4 Market outcome
We ﬁrst analyze the market outcome for any given allocation of the skilled between the production
sector and the elite, and for any given spatial distribution (λS,λU) of skilled and unskilled workers
across regions. Furthermore, tU and tS are considered ﬁxed at this stage.
Since the elite is, by assumption, immobile and tied to region 1, the net aggregate incomes














Sw1 + (1 − λ
S)w2] (11)
Y2 = (1 − λ
U)U + (1 − λ
S)Sw2(1 − t
S). (12)
The market outcome is a solution to the four equations (8), (9), (11) and (12) in the four unknowns
w1, w2, Y1 and Y2. The unique solution in wages w∗
1 and w∗
2 to this linear system is relegated to
Appendix A.1.20 It can readily be veriﬁed that w∗
1 and w∗
2 reduce to the corresponding expressions
in Forslid and Ottaviano (2003) in the no-tax case with a symmetric distribution of the unskilled
(tU = tS = 0 and λU = 1/2).
Some comments are in order. First, both w∗
1 and w∗
2 are increasing in the unskilled-to-skilled
ratio U/S, which will itself be endogenously determined later in our analysis. The reason for this is
19There is a long-standing tradition which assumes that there are some ﬁxed entry costs for becoming a member of
the elite (see, e.g., Ades, 1995, for further references). For simplicity, we disregard these costs in this paper. Adding
them would reinforce our results but make the algebra more involved.
20Because Y ∗
1 and Y ∗
2 are complicated expressions that are not required for the subsequent analysis, we do not
provide their analytical expressions.
16that, on top of standard endowment eﬀects, a larger supply of skilled production workers increases
the mass of competing ﬁrms, which leads to global product market crowding and, therefore, lower
equilibrium wages. Such an eﬀect does not arise in standard neg models where the mass of ﬁrms is
usually proportional to the exogenously ﬁxed mass of skilled workers (Krugman, 1991; Ottaviano et
al., 2002). Second, since the denominator of w∗
i does not depend on λU, we clearly have ∂w∗
1/∂λU > 0
and ∂w∗
2/∂λU < 0. In words, there is ‘complementarity in agglomeration’ as the clustering of the
unskilled in one region raises skilled workers’ wages there and reduces skilled workers’ wages in
the other region. Hence, agglomeration forces in our setup are stronger than in traditional models
where the unskilled are immobile and assumed to be evenly spread across regions. Finally, standard
but longer calculations show that w∗
2 is decreasing in tS, whereas w∗
1 is increasing in tS. Stated
diﬀerently, increasing taxation of the skilled shifts nominal wages in favor of the capital region and
away from the periphery. The reason is that as tS increases, the elite spends proportionally more
tax revenues on varieties produced in the capital region, thereby raising demand and wages there.
As we show later, the widening interregional wage gap induced by taxation increases the tendency
for agglomeration of the mobile sector.
4 Spatial equilibrium
Let ∆US∗ stand for the indirect utility diﬀerential between regions 1 and 2 of a skilled worker, which
























Recalling that unskilled wages are normalized to unity and equal across locations, the indirect utility



















Both skilled and unskilled workers are spatially mobile. We assume that the unskilled have het-
erogeneous regional tastes, whereas the skilled do not display any particular regional attachment.21
21A few comments are in order. First, what matters for our analysis here is that the unskilled are not perfectly
mobile and thus generate a dispersion force in the model. Yet, we want to make them somewhat mobile to account for
the observed unskilled migration to cities in many developing countries. Second, we could readily introduce another
parameter that governs the imperfect interregional mobility of the skilled, but doing so would make the model very
heavy. It is well known that the skilled are more mobile than the unskilled, and we capture this diﬀerential mobility
in a parsimonious way. Furthermore, if we think of the unskilled as being primarily employed in agriculture, land
ownership puts additional constraints on their possible migration behavior. Last, as pointed out by a referee, the elite
is usually immobile in many countries and this seems to conﬂict with our assumed migration behavior of the skilled.
Yet, recall that for skilled to be in the elite, they have to be de facto immobile and located in the capital. Ex ante,
the skilled who want to be part of the elite are mobile, yet ex post they are not.
17Following Tabuchi and Thisse (2002) and Murata (2003), we assume that the unskilled have id-
iosyncratic preferences for unobserved regional characteristics. More precisely, an unskilled worker









r is the realization of a random variable that is double exponentially distributed with zero
mean and variance equal to π2β2/6. The parameter β is referred to as the unskilled workers’
degree of regional taste heterogeneity. When β is large, regional tastes are very heterogeneous and
the unskilled distribute themselves more equally across regions. In the limit where β → ∞, the
unskilled have extremely heterogeneous tastes and a regional attachment that is so strong that they
become immobile and split themselves symmetrically across regions. On the other hand, the smaller
is β the more the unskilled choose regions as a function of economic opportunities only. In the limit
where β → 0, the unskilled have the same tastes and all react in the same way to diﬀerences in
regional economic incentives.
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r /β + eUU∗
s /β, r  = s.
The law of motion of the unskilled is then given by dλU/dt = (1−λU)Pr−λUPs, which is the inﬂow
minus the outﬂow of agents given the intial distribution and their choice probabilities. A spatial
equilibrium is such that dλU/dt = 0, i.e., Pr/Ps = λU/(1 − λU). It then follows that
λU
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is the regional cost-of-living diﬀerence. Since the regional price indices P1 and P2 do not directly
depend on λU, there exists a unique solution λU(λS) to equation (13). The expression being cum-














S > 0 so that ∂λ
U(λ
S)/∂λ
S > 0. (15)
This reﬂects again the ‘complementarity in agglomeration’ between the skilled and the unskilled.
By symmetry, it is readily veriﬁed that λU(1/2) = 1/2. Furthermore, it is easy to check that
18λU(λS) < 1 for all parameter values of the model. Finally, observe that for any given distribution
λS of skilled workers, ∂UU∗/∂λU = −β/[λU(1−λU)] < 0. In words, for any spatial allocation where
skilled workers have no incentives to move, unskilled workers have no incentives to move either. This
property will ease the subsequent stability analysis of the spatial equilibrium.
Having a unique and well-behaved solution λU(λS) – as well as complementarity between λU
and λS – allows us to reduce an a priori complex problem with mobility of both the skilled and
the unskilled to a simpler problem where we can focus only on the mobility of the skilled, but take
into account the implied distribution of the unskilled. In words, the essentially two-dimensional
problem boils down to a one-dimensional one, which will make the analysis of the equilibrium (and
its stability) easier.
A spatial equilibrium is such that no worker (neither skilled nor unskilled) has an incentive to
change location, conditional upon the fact that product markets clear at the equilibrium prices and
factor markets clear at the equilibrium wages. Formally, a spatial equilibrium arises at λS∗ ∈ (0,1)
and λU∗ = λU(λS∗) when ∆US∗(λS∗) = 0; or at λS∗ = 0 and λU∗ = λU(0) if ∆US∗(0) ≤ 0; or at
λS∗ = 1 and λU∗ = λU(1) if ∆US∗(1) ≥ 0. Following Fujita et al. (1999), an interior equilibrium
is said to be stable if and only if the slope of the indirect utility diﬀerential ∆US∗ is negative
in a neighborhood of the equilibrium, whereas the two agglomerated equilibria are always stable
whenever they exist (recall that ∆V U∗ is always downward-sloping in λU for any given value of λS,
i.e., there is never locational instability because of the migration incentives of the unskilled).
4.1 No taxes but mobile unskilled labor
Appendix A.3 presents the benchmark case without taxes and with symetrically distributed immobile
unskilled labor. This case has been previously analyzed by Forslid and Ottaviano (2003) and we
report their results as a benchmark only. Note that our model boils down to theirs when (tU,tS) = 0
and β → ∞, in which case λU = 1/2 irrespective of the spatial distribution of the skilled.
In what follows, we investigate the spatial equilibrium with either mobile unskilled workers, or
positive taxes, or both. Let us ﬁrst consider the case without taxes (tU = 0 and tS = 0) but where
the unskilled are interregionally mobile. In this case, some longer calculations show that that the






















2(φ − 1) + (σ − 1)σ(φ − 1) − µ(1 − 2σ)(φ + 1) < 0,
where the term on the second line corresponds to the one that determines the break-point φb in
Forslid and Ottaviano (2003). Since the term on the ﬁrst line is always positive at φ = φb and
decreasing in φ, whereas the term on the second line is increasing in φ and by deﬁnition nil at φb, it
is clear that the break-point with mobile unskilled labor must be smaller that the break-point with
immobile unskilled labor. In words, symmetry must be broken and agglomeration will arise for higher
values of transport costs than when unskilled labor is immobile. Furthermore, it is easy to see that
symmetry-breaking must occur sooner the smaller the value of β. Of course, when β = 0, only full
agglomeration can be sustained as an equilibrium since the only dispersion force vanishes (i.e., all
unskilled react in the same way to regional economic diﬀerences). Last, as shown in Appendix A.4,
full agglomeration can be quite naturally sustained for a larger range of transport costs when the
unskilled are mobile than when they are not.
The foregoing results can be summarized as follows:
Proposition 1 (mobility of the unskilled and agglomeration) When the unskilled are mobile
across regions: (i) the capital hosts a larger share of the unskilled population; (ii) full agglomeration
in the capital is more likely and can occur for higher values of transport costs than in the case where
the unskilled are immobile.
Proof. See Appendix A.4.
4.2 Taxes and immobile unskilled labor
Assume next that the elite levies taxes (tU > 0 and/or tS > 0) but that the unskilled are interre-
gionally immobile (β → ∞ so that λU = 1/2). For now, we consider given tax rates. In this case,
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is negative deﬁnite whenever (17) holds. Both of its eigenvalues are negative if and only if J11 < 0, J22 < 0 and
J11J22 > |J12J21|. The ﬁrst condition (J11 < 0) holds when (17) is satisﬁed, and the other two (J22 < 0 and
J11J22 > |J12J21|) are then trivially satisﬁed since J21 = 0 and J22 < 0 in our model. Since the foregoing conditions
on J21 and J22 do not depend on the value of λU, some condition on J11 is suﬃcient to make sure that an interior
equilibrium is locally stable.
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where the ﬁrst term on the right-hand side corresponds to Forslid and Ottaviano’s (2003) indirect
utility diﬀerential, as given by (A.4) in Appendix A.3. Since the second term on the right-hand
side of (18) is unambiguously positive for all tU > 0 and/or tS > 0, and since what matters for the
spatial equilibrium is the sign of ∆V ∗, we have the following result.
Proposition 2 (taxation and agglomeration) When compared with the no-tax case, (i) in case
of an interior equilibrium, the capital hosts a larger share of the mobile skilled population under
positive taxes, i.e., λS∗(tS,tU) ≥ λS∗(0,0) when (tS,tU) > 0; and (ii) full agglomeration in the
capital is more likely under positive taxes.
Proof. See Appendix A.5.
Proposition 2 shows that taxation increases agglomeration in the capital. This is because of the
redistribution of purchasing power from the periphery to the capital (‘urban bias’), which entices
ﬁrms and agents to locate there. In the words of Ades and Glaeser (1995, p.199), “the political
power [induces] the government to transfer resources to the capital, and these transfers will attract
migrants”.23 Before proceeding, a few remarks are in order.
First, although taxation by the elite increases agglomeration, we cannot compute the (partially
agglomerated) stable interior equilibrium analytically. Indeed, the indirect utility diﬀerential is a
transcendental function, which does not allow for explicit solutions in λS in the general case. By
consequence, it is also impossible to explicitly characterize the break point for λS  = 1/2, since this
requires the evaluation of the sign of the derivative of ∆V S∗ at the interior equilibrium that we do
not know. In this respect, our analysis faces the same problems as those encountered by Forslid and
Ottaviano (2003) and Baldwin and Krugman (2004). Yet, these authors have shown that exogenous
size diﬀerences or diﬀerential taxation favor the degree of agglomeration in the region having the
larger market (in terms of consumption expenditure), and this result continues to hold true here.
Second, contrary to Forslid and Ottaviano (2003) and Baldwin and Krugman (2004), the value
of S will be endogenously determined by the process of elite formation in our model. Observe
that what usually matters in the ces model are the expenditure share µ and the trade costs τ, so
that the size of the elite does not appear a priori to be of fundamental importance for the spatial
23The conditions for full agglomeration in the other region are no longer symmetric, due to asymmetries in regional
spending induced by the presence of the elite (see also Forslid and Ottaviano, 2003, pp.237–239).
21equilibrium. Although this is true when the unskilled are immobile (see (18)), it no longer holds
true in the case where the unskilled are mobile (see Appendix A.2). The reason is that more skilled
workers generally impact on the price indices, and those drive location decisions of the unskilled.
Hence, when the unskilled are mobile, the size of the elite has an impact on their location pattern.
Furthermore, one should keep in mind that the size of the elite will also inﬂuence tax-setting in all
cases we consider, which has itself an impact on the spatial equilibrium and which is the focus of
our subsequent analysis.24




















The reason is, as in the foregoing, that higher elite expenditure in the capital attracts mobile ﬁrms
and agents (both skilled and unskilled).
4.3 Taxes and mobile unskilled labor
Last, let us consider the spatial equilibrium in the most general case with mobile unskilled labor and
taxation. As should be clear from the foregoing results, summarized in Propositions 1 and 2, both
unskilled labor mobility and taxation make the occurence of agglomeration of the skilled and the
unskilled in the capital more likely. In the former case, the symmetric equilibrium becomes unstable
for a larger range of trade costs; in the latter case, the indirect utility diﬀerential shifts upwards,
which increases the value of λS∗ at any stable interior equilibrium and makes full agglomeration more
likely. Unfortunately, the analytical expressions become very cumbersome and no longer informative
when unskilled labor mobility and taxation are jointly taken into consideration. Since both the slope
and the locus of the indirect utility diﬀerential are aﬀected by unskilled mobility and taxation, the
analysis no longer yields clear results. Yet, we can easily depict the diﬀerent cases numerically as in
Figure 2.
Insert Figure 2 about here.
Figure 2 illustrates the four possible cases of: (a) immobile unskilled labor and no taxes; (b)
mobile unskilled labor and no taxes; (c) immobile unskilled labor and taxes; and (d) mobile un-
skilled labor and taxes. Comparing panels (a) and (b), we can see that unskilled mobility does not
24The spatial equilibrium would depend even more strongly on S if skilled workers and members of the elite had
diﬀerent expenditure shares for diﬀerentiated goods. An additional channel through which the size of the elite, and
thus the number of ﬁrms, is likely to inﬂuence the spatial equilibrium is through more product-market competition
in frameworks that allow for variable demand elasticities and pro-competitive eﬀects (e.g., Ottaviano et al., 2002;
Behrens and Murata, 2007).
22fundamentally shift the locus ∆US∗ yet does make the symmetric equilibrium less stable. Com-
paring panels (a) and (c), one can see that taxation, and the associated expenditure shift towards
the capital, shifts the locus ∆US∗ upwards. As a result, more skilled workers agglomerate in the
capital as the market size expands there. Last, putting both taxes and mobility together, we can
see by comparing (a) and (d) that both reinforce each other and lead to more (eventually full as
shown in the ﬁgure) agglomeration of the mobile skilled in the capital. All these results mirror those
established analytically in Propositions 1 and 2.
5 Elite formation and taxation
In this section, we focus on the dual issues of elite formation and tax setting by the elite.
5.1 Elite formation
Only the skilled have the opportunity of entering the political elite of the country. Every skilled
worker therefore faces the binary choice of: (i) staying in the production sector, earning an after-tax
wage of wi(1 − tS) when he is located in region i; or (ii) leaving the production sector to become
part of the political elite, thereby securing a claim to the revenues generated by taxation. In the
latter case, the worker has to move to the capital since the beneﬁts of the elite can only be reaped
by being close to the center of power. Recalling that E denotes the mass of elite agents, the mass
of productive skilled workers is given by S = S − E. As pointed out in Section 3.3, we assume
that skilled workers’ only cost of entering the elite is to forfeit the wage they could have earned in
the production sector.25 The beneﬁt of doing so is to secure a claim to an equal share of tax rents
levied by the elite. Formally, skilled workers will choose to enter the elite if doing so yields a higher
indirect utility than staying in the productive sector.
In what follows we focus, for analytical tractability, on the case with full agglomeration of all
skilled into the capital region 1 (i.e., λS∗ = 1).26 We know from Proposition 2 that the presence
of an elite reinforces agglomeration, which implies that we can focus on the case in which there is
dispersion in the absence of an elite, whereas there is full agglomeration in its presence (numerical
25At an aggregate level, there is an additional cost of workers moving into the elite: the range of consumption
varieties decreases. Yet, since each worker is negligible in the aggregate economy, this is not a cost stemming from
an individual decision to enter the elite and is, therefore, disregarded when making that choice.
26This assumption is justiﬁed by the fact that the elite would always choose to implement full agglomeration in
its region of residence because this maximizes its access to product variety (see also Charlot et al., 2005, Prop. 3).
A convenient by-product of letting λS∗ = 1 is that we can draw clearer analytical conclusions since the optimal
tax-setting behavior of the elite does not depend on the spatial distribution of the unskilled (which is not true at an
interior equilibrium, as discussed at the end of this section).
23examples are easy to construct). Although this scenario is a special case, our results extend to the
cases with partial agglomeration, as shown at the end of this section with the help of a numerical
example.
We start with the question of how the unproductive political elite is formed, and how it sets














stand for the indirect utility diﬀerential between a member of the elite and a productive skilled in
the capital. Elite formation will take place until indirect utilities are equalized. Using the elite
members’ income r∗, given by (10), the value of E will be determined such that
S












Letting λS∗ = 1 and using S ≡ ¯ S − E, the mass E of the elite will be determined such that
(¯ S − E)
(σ − 1)tU + tS
E
− (1 − t
S) = 0. (20)
The unique solution E∗ to (20) is such that:
E
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, and hence S
∗ = ¯ S
1 − tS
1 + tU(σ − 1)
. (21)
Expression (21) shows that there is no political elite when there is no taxation (tS = tU = 0), whereas
when rent-extraction from the skilled is complete (tS = 1) all skilled workers want to be part of the
elite. Furthermore, taxation reduces the mass of productive skilled by inﬂating the unproductive
elite, thereby decreasing product variety and consumption beneﬁts. This latter aspect may be quite
important in practice but has, to the best of our knowledge, not really been highlighted in models
of agglomeration and rent-seeking until now. Some straightforward calculations further show that
(∂E∗)/(∂σ) > 0. These results may be summarized as follows:
Proposition 3 (size of the elite) Under full agglomeration in the capital, the size of the unpro-
ductive elite decreases with the degree of product diﬀerentiation (smaller σ) and increases with both
tax rates tS and tU.
Note that a smaller degree of product diﬀerentiation (higher σ) tends to inﬂate the size of
the unproductive elite. The intuition underlying this result is that when ﬁrms in the manufacturing
sector have little market power they pay lower wages, which raises the payoﬀ to political rent-seeking
when compared to production. Everything else equal, this fosters entry into the elite.
Insert Figure 3 about here.
24Turning to the size of the elite in the absence of full agglomeration, we have to resort to numerical
illustrations to gauge the qualitative behavior of the model. As can be seen from Figure 3, increasing
taxation of the unskilled leads to (a) an increase in the equilibrium size of the elite, (b) an associated
decrease in the size of the productive skilled workforce, (c) more agglomeration of the skilled in the
capital, and (d) increasing agglomeration of the unskilled in the capital. All of these results are in
line with the qualitative behavior of our model established in the previous sections and in expression
(21). It is thus fair to say that, even though the case with λS∗ = 1 is a special one, it’s qualitative
behavior is not radically diﬀerent from the one we observe at an interior equilibrium.
5.2 Tax setting
The ﬁnal stage involves tax setting by the elite, taking into account how its decisions inﬂuence
subsequent entry into the elite by skilled workers. In what follows, we assume that the elite sets tax
rates such as to maximize its indirect utility and not necessarily its tax revenue. Stated diﬀerently,
the elite takes into account the fact that higher taxes and the subsequent entry into the elite reduces
product variety and welfare by diverting productive resources.27
The indirect utility of a member of the political elite is given by UE∗ = r∗/P
µ
1. Letting S∗ =
S − E∗, λS∗ = 1, and using r∗ as given by (10), we then obtain:
U
E∗    
λS=1=
 
(σ − 1)(1 − tU)
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Substituting the expression of E∗ as given by (21), and using w∗
1, we ﬁnally get
∆U
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1 − tU µ  




σ − µ − (σ − 1)tUµ
(23)
and where κ > 0 is a bundle of parameters. The elite maximizes (22) with respect to the taxes tU
and tS. Since µ/(σ − 1) > 0, we see that ∆UE∗ is always decreasing in tS. Stated diﬀerently, the
elite sets tS∗ = 0. This suﬃces to establish the following result:
27In public economic terms, the elite is not a leviathan but a welfare maximizer (for itself). Note that the leviathan
case is likely to lead to an even larger elite as it disregards the negative variety eﬀect. Note also that the ‘variety
constraint’ faced by the elite, which limits its ability to extract rents, may be less stringent nowadays because imports
can supplement the needs of the elite. Stated diﬀerently, international trade may be a driver for agglomeration in
a setting where an unproductive elites maximizes its welfare since it increases their extractive capacity. Though
interesting, we disregard this possibility in what follows as modeling these issues is beyond the scope of this paper.
25Proposition 4 (optimal skilled taxation) At any spatial equilibrium with full agglomeration,
the elite will set a zero tax rate on the skilled (tS∗ = 0).
The intuition underlying Proposition 4 is that V E∗ = V S∗ by arbitrage, so that the objective of
maximizing the welfare of the elite is congruent with the objective of maximizing the welfare of the
skilled. Consequently, the skilled will not be taxed. Results with respect to the unskilled tax rate
tU are more complicated to establish. Yet, we can show the following:
Proposition 5 (optimal unskilled taxation) At any spatial equilibrium with full agglomeration,









1 + 4(1 − µ)µ < 2
such that (i) tU∗ = 0 and there is no entry into the elite (E∗ = 0) when σ ≤ σt; and (ii) there is a
unique 0 < tU∗ < 1 with entry into the elite (E∗ > 0) when σ > σt.
Proof. See Appendix A.6.
Proposition 5 shows that when products are suﬃciently diﬀerentiated and ﬁrms have enough
market power, there will be no elite formation in equilibrium, even if it is a priori possible. The
intuition underlying this result is that, since it is proﬁtable enough to work in the production sector,
agents cannot win by pursuing unproductive rent-seeking. This ﬁnding suggests that a strong
reliance on relatively homogeneous products, as often observed in developing countries, may be a
strong driver for elite formation as the relative payoﬀ of unproductive to productive activity is large.
Entry of skilled into the elite both erodes per capita rents in a standard way and, by taxing agents
and thus raising production costs, increases wages in the modern sector. Both eﬀects are penalizing
and may be strong enough to prevent elite formation in equilibrium.
Insert Figure 4 about here.
It can be shown that tU∗ is strictly decreasing in µ when σt < σ ≤ 2, whereas it is ﬁrst decreasing
and then increasing in µ when σ > 2 (see panel (a) in Figure 4 for the latter case). The intuition
underlying the second eﬀect is that when expenditures on the modern sector account only for a small
part of their budget, consumers are willing to buy even when the price is high, which allows for more
taxation of the unskilled without reducing tax revenues and product variety. Clear-cut comparative
static results with respect to σ are not easily derived since the various thresholds are parametrized
by σ. Yet, numerical examples suggest that, as expected, tU∗ is increasing in σ (see panel (b) in
Figure 4 for an illustration). The less diﬀerentiated the varieties are, the higher the unskilled tax
rate. The reason is that higher unskilled taxes raise production costs in the diﬀerentiated sector,
thereby eroding proﬁts, triggering entry into the elite and reducing product diversity – the latter
eﬀect is, however, not too penalizing when diversity matters only little for welfare.
26To summarize our main ﬁndings, both a large expenditure share on the agricultural good and
little product diﬀerentiation in the manufacturing sector are drivers for high tax rates on the unskilled
and a large elite, as they erode the returns to production activity. Both of these features seem to be
largely prevalent in the developing world and may, therefore, be linked to the presence of a sizeable
unproductive elite.28
6 Conclusions
The model we presented suggests that both unskilled labor mobility and rent-seeking behavior may
fuel the formation of large urban centers in developing countries via interregional income shifts and
transfers. Even when increasing returns and the freeness of trade are too low for agglomeration
to occur in equilibrium in the ‘standard’ neg model, spatial concentration may nevertheless arise
because of the additional purchasing power generated in the capital by either unskilled labor mobility
or tax-based transfers from the country-side.29 We have shown that rent-seeking will always lead to
the formation of an elite provided that goods are not too diﬀerentiated. Furthermore, the elite sets
zero tax rates for skilled workers when maximizing its own welfare. This result is consistent with the
observation that the main bulk of taxation falls heavily on the poor in developing countries. The
smaller the elite, the higher the incentives for skilled to engage in rent-seeking behavior because the
payoﬀ in doing so rises. If we proxy the share of skilled by that of people with higher education, we
see that ssa (with only 2.43% of enrollment in higher education; Barro and Lee, 2001) has one of
the worst performances in this respect. When combined with the low returns to private investment,
the payoﬀ to skilled of entering the political elite may be quite large in this region of the world.
Other factors also contribute to increase the size of the elite in ssa. Indeed, we have shown that in
equilibrium the size of the elite is inversely related to the share of manufacturing expenses in national
income (via the equilibrium tax rates) and to the degree of product diﬀerentiation. As a matter
of fact, low product diﬀerentiation is likely to be a feature of ssa, because economic development
is positively correlated with product diversity (Falkinger and Zweim¨ uller, 1996). Moreover, most
28As pointed out in the foregoing, the case where the elite is not constrained to be fully agglomerated in the capital
is more complicated to analyze as analytical solutions for λS∗ are not available. Knowing the spatial distribution of
the unskilled λU∗ for any given triple (λS,tS,tU), we could solve the system of equations ∆US = 0, ∂US/∂tS = 0
and ∂US/∂tU = 0 for those three variables to simulate the model. We conjecture that results would be similar.
29A particularily illuminating example of high trade costs in developing countries is detailed in the article
“The road to hell is unpaved” of the December 19, 2002, print edition of The Economist (available online at
http://www.economist.com/ PrinterFriendly.cfm?Story ID=1487583). Due to administrative hassle, 47 road-
blocks and poor infrastructure, a 500 kilometer trip by truck from Douala to Bertoua took four days, with only
two-thirds of the original load of Guinness arriving at its destination (a real ‘iceberg’ trade cost). Bad infrastructure
and high transaction costs therefore add substantially to total shipping costs.
27ssa countries are characterized by small manufacturing sectors and small expenditure shares on
manufactured goods. ssa was in 2002 the region exhibiting the lowest ratio of manufacturing value
added to GDP (13.6% versus 15.8%, 18.2%, 20.1% and 33.1% for Latin America & Caribbean,
Europe & Central Asia, the European Union, and East Asia & Paciﬁc, respectively). Looking only
at ssa is even more informative: of the 43 ssa countries, 23 have ratios of less than 10% and 9 have
ratios of even less than 5%.30 This suggests that the payoﬀ to productive work is quite low, enticing
skilled workers to engage in rent-seeking activities, which might drive urban primacy.
Observe ﬁnally that the presence of a rent-seeking elite also reduces the range of available goods
because it diverts productive resources. In an endogenous growth setting where varieties also serve
as intermediate inputs (Grossman and Helpman, 1991), less variety due to the presence of the elite
may damage long-run growth, which might lead to a relatively bad growth performance as observed
in ssa. Indeed, that region has witnessed an urban growth rate signiﬁcantly outpacing its economic
growth rate over the last two decades.
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Appendix A: Proofs and technicalities
A.1. Skilled wages
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for all tS, tU and λS given the restrictions 0 ≤ λS ≤ 1, 0 ≤ λU ≤ 1, σ > 1 and 0 < µ < 1.
A.2. Indirect utility diﬀerential
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and where D(tS,tU,λS) is given by (A.1) in Appendix A.1. Observe that since K is strictly positive,
it does not aﬀect the sign of the right-hand side of expression (A.2) and may thus be neglected in
the determination of the spatial equilibrium (even though that term does depend on λS). Yet, we
need to take it into account when evaluating the derivative of ∆US∗(tS,tU).
A.3. Benchmark case
Let us start with the case where tS = tU = 0 and β → ∞. It is readily veriﬁed that the latter
condition implies that λU = 1/2 for all values of λS, which corresponds to the benchmark case of
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As shown by Forslid and Ottaviano (2003), full agglomeration may be sustained as an equilibrium
if and only if
∆US∗(0,0)
K(0,0)





     
λS=0
= 2σφ −





which implicitly deﬁnes the sustain point φs as the value of φ that equates the above expression
to zero. Full agglomeration can be sustained for all φ ≥ φs. Additionally, there are at most three
interior equilibria in the no-tax case (Robert-Nicoud, 2005), of which the symmetric one (λS∗ = 1/2)
always exists. The stability of the equilibrium λS∗ = 1/2 depends on the sign of the derivative of the
indirect utility diﬀerential, whereas the other two interior equilibria are always unstable. Computing





µ − σ + 1
1 − µ − σ
. (A.5)
Hence, λ∗ = 1/2 is a stable spatial equilibrium for all φ ≤ φb. Note, ﬁnally, that both types of
equilibria occur for values φs ≤ φ ≤ φb, in which case both full agglomeration and full dispersion
are stable spatial equilibria.
33A.4. Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. We have
∆U
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since tanh(x) < 0 for all x < 0. Hence, full agglomeration can be sustained for a larger range of
parameter values when the unskilled are mobile than when they are not.
A.5. Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. In both cases, let λS∗
0 denote the value of λS such that ∆US∗(0,0)




(18) at this value yields
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which is strictly positive. This shows that: (i) when there is a dispersed equilibrium without taxes,
the equilibrium with taxes must involve more agglomeration since the utility diﬀerential at that no-
tax spatial equilibrium is strictly positive; and (ii) when there is full agglomeration without taxes,
there is also full agglomeration with taxes since
∆US∗(tS,tU)
K(tS,tU)











is strictly positive because ∆US∗(0,0)/K(0,0)
   
λS=1> 0 (since full agglomeration is sustainable
without taxes). Finally, since the second term in (A.6) is strictly positive we see that: (iii) there are
parameter values for which full agglomeration is sustainable with taxation, whereas it is not in the
absence of taxation. When taken together, conditions (i), (ii), and (iii) show that taxation cannot
make the economy less agglomerated in the capital, which establishes Proposition 2.
A.6. Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. To prove our claim, we need to analyze the function ξ, as given by (23). First, note that ξ is












34Stated diﬀerently, prohibitive taxation leads to zero tax revenue and zero utility for the elite, whereas
suﬃciently low taxation yields positive utility. Second, one can check that ∂ξ/∂tU = 0 if and only if
t
U =




(1 − µ)(σ − µ − 1)[σ + µ(µ + 3σ − 4) − 1] − 1
 
2µ2(σ − 2)(σ − 1)
.
It is readily veriﬁed that the larger of the two roots exceeds 1 and, therefore, does not belong to the
range of admissible values. Consequently, ξ is either monotonously decreasing on [0,1], or admits a
unique maximum (the existence of an interior minimum is ruled out by (A.7) and because ξ ≥ 0).
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Equating this expression to zero, the two roots with respect to σ are such that the smaller one is









1 + 4(1 − µ)µ < 2.
Hence, when σ < σt the function ξ is strictly decreasing for all tax rates and the elite’s best choice
is to not tax the unskilled. Obviously, there will be no elite in that case. When σ > σt, the elite
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which establishes Proposition 5.
Appendix B: Data and descriptives
Our cross-sectional dataset consists of 164 countries. It draws on publicly available data only. The
dataset, as well as the list of countries, is available upon request (Table B.1 below provides summary
statistics). The following variables are available:
1. Urban primacy is deﬁned as the percentage of urban population living in the country’s largest
city. This data is computed from the un Populations Division “World Urbanization Prospects
Population Database: The 2009 Revision” for the year 2005, available online at http://esa.un.
org/unpd/wup/index.htm, also accessible from the World Bank online data http://data.
worldbank.org/. Retrieved on 2011-05-10.
352. The ﬁrst Ratio of largest to second-largest city is computed from the un Populations Division
“World Urbanization Prospects Population Database: The 2003 Revision” for the year 2000.
3. The second Ratio of largest to second-largest city is computed from table 08 2005 of the 2005
Demographic Yearbook, available at http://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/products/
dyb/dyb2005/table08.xls. This ratio uses a more restrictive deﬁnition of the city.31 Re-
trieved on 2011-05-10.
4. Food expenditure share in consumption for the year 2005 is taken from ers, United States De-
partment of Agriculture, available at http://www.ers.usda.gov/Data/InternationalFood
Demand/DATA TABLES/Table7.xls. Retrieved on 2011-05-10.
5. Non-corruption index is the “2005 Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index”
(cpi). It ranges from 1 (most corrupt) to 10 (least corrupt). It “[...] focuses on corruption
in the public sector and deﬁnes corruption as the abuse of public oﬃce for private gain. The
surveys used in compiling the cpi ask questions that relate to the misuse of public power
for private beneﬁt, with a focus, for example, on bribe-taking by public oﬃcials in pub-
lic procurement.” Available online at http://www.transparency.org/policy and research
/surveys indices/cpi/2005. Retrieved on 2011-05-10.
6. Top income tax rate and top corporate tax rate are taken from the “2004 Index of Economic
Freedom”, available at http://www.heritage.org/index/explore?view=by-variables. Last
accessed on 2011-05-18.
31The ﬁrst ‘largest to second-largest city’ ratio is computed from 2000 data obtained from the 2003 Revision of
the un Populations Division World Urbanization Prospects Population Database (WUP, 2000). Since later revi-
sions of the World Urbanization Prospects only provide ﬁgures for urban agglomerations with more than 750,000
inhabitants in the year of the revision, we could not obtain from them ratios with similar coverage. We thus
also consider data from the 2005 Demographic Yearbook (DYB, 2005). The problem with that data is that it
has a signiﬁcant coverage only when the city proper is considered as the unit of analysis. The city proper is
usually deﬁned as a “locality with legally ﬁxed boundaries and an administratively recognized urban status that
is usually characterized by some form of local government” (Demographic Yearbook, 2005, notes available on-
line http://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/products/dyb/dyb2005/NotesTab08.pdf; accessed on 2011-05-
10). As the implied delineations may not correspond to those of the agglomerations considered in WUP 2000, this
may give rise to inconsistencies between the two sets of data. DYB 2005 provides data about the population of
capital cities and of cities with more than 100,000 inhabitants for the latest available year between 1986 and 2005.
Therefore, the year of data collection varies by country. Data collection methods also diﬀer as distinct approaches
have been used: census (de facto or de jure, complete or sample tabulation), sample survey (de facto or de jure),
and estimates (de facto or de jure). All those diﬀerences between these two sets of data in terms of city delineation,
year and methods of data collection explain the discrepancies between the descriptive statistics of the two sets of
ratios. Regarding the aforementioned issues, the ratios computed from the World Urbanization Prospects appear
more credible.
367. Size of the shadow economy in 2002/2003 as percentage of GDP is taken from Schneider (2004,
Table 5.4).
8. GDP per capita, PPP in 2005 $US is taken from the World Bank online data, available at
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.KD?page=1. Retrieved on 2011-
05-10.
9. Central government expenditures on goods, services, and compensation of employees in %
of central government expenditures in 2005 is computed from the World Bank online data,
available at http://data.worldbank.org. Retrieved on 2011-05-10.
The panel dataset covers the 1980–2005 period in ﬁve years interval. The “city states” of Hong
Kong and Singapore and Macau were excluded from estimations and descriptive statistics. As for the
cross-sectional database, it only draws on publicly available data. The source of the urban primacy,
GDP per capita, PPP variables have already been mentioned. The sources of the other variables
are the following:
1. Urban population available online at http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.URB.TOTL.
Retrieved on 2011-07-06.
2. Democracy index used is the POLITY2 Revised Combined Polity Score proposed by the Polity
IV project (Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800–2009). This score is ob-
tained by subtracting the Autocracy score (AUTOC) from the Democracy score (DEMOC);
the resulting uniﬁed polity scale ranges from -10 (strongly autocratic) to +10 (strongly demo-
cratic). Data and full documentation on variables are available online at http://www.systemic
peace.org/polity/polity4.htm. Retrieved on 2011-06-06.
3. Non corruption index (5 previous years) used is the Freedom from corruption available online
from 1995 to 2011 at http://www.heritage.org/index/explore?view=by-region-country-
year. Last accessed on 2011-07-06.
4. Ethnolinguistic fractionalization index used is the 1985 index proposed by Philip G. Roeder,
Department of Political Science, University of California, San Diego available online at the
address http://weber.ucsd.edu/~proeder/elf.htm. Last accessed on 2011-07-06.
5. Data on religious aﬃliation has been gathered from several sources: national census (through
http://www.wikipedia.org), cia World Factbook (from https://www.cia.gov/library/
publications/the-world-factbook/), Religiously Remapped - Mapping Religious Trends In
Africa (http://www.religiouslyremapped.info/Religiously Remapped/Homepage.html).
Last accessed on 2011-06.
376. Data on infrastructure: roadways, railways, waterways densities & percentage of paved roads
obtained from the cia World Factbook (https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
world-factbook/). Last accessed on 2011-06.
Table B.1: Summary statistics (full cross-section sample)
Variable Obs. Min Max Mean Std. dev.
% of urban population in the largest city 161 2.88 75.76 32.16 14.88
Ratio of largest to second-largest city (wup, 2000) 129 1.02 20.60 4.10 3.20
Ratio of largest to second-largest city (dyb, 2005) 109 1.07 11.64 3.20 3.26
Food expenditure share 134 5.7 63.4 29.06 13.42
Non-corruption index 155 1.7 9.6 3.94 2.07
Top income tax rate 138 0 65 33.09 13.77
Top corporate tax rate 138 0 58 29.86 8.65
Size of the shadow economy (% GDP) 124 8.4 68.3 35.31 13.92
Central government expenditures 98 0.00 84.84 39.54 20.03
GDP per capita PPP 158 265.95 68,319.19 11,285.30 13,124.80
Table B.2: Summary statistics (full panel sample)
Variable Obs. Min Max Mean Std. dev.
urban primacy 1,191 0.025 1.221 0.413 0.246
ln(urban population) 1,213 8.437 20.082 14.249 2.297
ln(GDP per capita, PPP) 948 5.016 11.466 8.434 1.247
Democracy index (prev. 5 years) 727 -10 10 0.996 7.360
Non-corruption index 894 8.75 95.75 40.190 21.979
Non-corruption*ssa dummy 894 0 58.833 6.486 12.789
ln(land area) 1,260 0.693 16.611 10.878 2.976
Ethnolinguistic fractionalization index 1,008 0 0.984 0.459 0.274
Percentage of paved roads 972 0.799 100 50.971 33.289
Roadways/km2 1,200 0.005 25 0.903 2.133
Railways/km2 1,260 0 8.940 0.076 0.665
Waterways/km2 1,182 0.00 0.184 0.007 0.020
Percent catholics 1,116 0 98 31.786 32.704
Percent protestants 972 0 98.4 25.747 27.558
Percent muslims 954 0 100 30.788 38.193
38Appendix C: Panel data econometric procedure
C.1. Fixed eﬀects estimation with time-invariant variables
With two-stage procedures, it is possible to identify and consistently estimate the eﬀects of time-
invariant regressors in panel data settings with ﬁxed eﬀects. We use the two-stage GLS estimator
proposed by Oaxaca and Geisler (2003). They demonstrate the equivalence between that estimator
and the pooled OLS estimator with time-invariant covariates. Yet, the estimated standard errors
diﬀer between these two procedures. The ﬁrst stage of the GLS procedure implies the ﬁxed ef-
fects within regression. This allows to obtain the vector ˆ ωFE of time-varying covariates coeﬃcients
estimates, with ω = (β0,β1,β2,β3,β4,β5)
′. The second step implies the following regression
primacyi. − Wi.ˆ ω
FE = α + Ziγ + ηi. (A.8)
where the subscript i. denotes country time averages, where ηi. = ξi. + Wi.
 









Equation (A.8) is estimated by GLS to correct the heteroscedasticity inherent in the diagonal ele-
ments of the variance-covariance matrix of ηi..
C.2. Instrumental variables estimation with time-invariant variables
Some components of ξit are likely to be correlated with regressors like income and the democracy
index. Furthermore, contemporaneous ξit shocks impacting migration to primate cities will also
aﬀect covariates either in the current year or in the future. To deal with those issues, we follow
the methodology used by Davis and Henderson (2003). Hence, we ﬁrst diﬀerence (1), yielding a set
of equation-years (2005–2000, 2000–1995, 1995–1990, 1990–1985, 1985–1980). This eliminates the
ﬁxed eﬀects as well as time-invariant variables Zi. Then, we estimate those equation-years jointly
by constraining coeﬃcients to be equal across years, considering all the time-varying regressors
as potentially endogeneous. Thus, for a given equation-year t minus t − 1 we instrument for all
time-varying regressors with level values of covariates in t − 2 and t − 3.32
To recover the eﬀects of time-invariant variables, we proceed as in the preceding subsection. We
consider the coeﬃcients estimated in the previous step and we compute the diﬀerence between the
primacy country average and the sum of the products of estimated coeﬃcients and country averages
of time-varying variables. By this procedure, we obtain country average residuals that we regress
by GLS on Zi.
32Following Davis and Henderson (2003), we supplement our predetermined list of variables by including predictors
of income and population growth, like gross capital formation and fertility rates, at t − 2 and t − 3.
39Table 1: Urban primacy in sub-Saharan Africa
% Urban Population in the largest city
Country 1980 1990 2000 2001 2005 2009
West Africa
Benin 12.0 31.5 24.69 22.87 21.93
Burkina Faso 41 50.6 38.3 48.55 52.77 56.44
Cote d’Ivoire 34 44.5 44.3 40.09 39.57 38.48
Gambia 100.0 100.0 50.43 46.32 44.70
Ghana 35 27.1 19.4 19.34 18.95 18.75
Guinea 80 76.1 46.6 46.82 46.37 45.43
Liberia 56.6 43.2 57.30 62.05 36.69
Mali 24 37.4 31.0 37.80 37.92 38.21
Mauritania 39 80.3 39.3 52.99 52.68 52.28
Niger 31 38.5 34.0 38.46 39.73 39.52
Nigeria 17 20.4 17.1 13.59 13.47 13.43
Senegal 65 55.9 44.2 50.74 51.86 51.95
Sierra Leone 47 51.7 49.5 45.23 41.75 40.36
Togo 60 56.1 52.6 53.38 54.79 56.35
Central Africa
Cameroon 21 21.9 22.4 18.12 18.25 18.27
Central African Rep 36 50.8 45.6 41.05 41.21 40.95
Chad 39 43.6 42.6 32.02 28.89 26.58
Congo, Rep. 56 68.6 54.4 56.06 57.00 56.85
Congo, Dem. Rep. 28 33.1 32.2 37.11 37.47 36.80
Gabon 56 59.7 49.52 49.24 49.08
East and NE Africa
Burundi 82.5 67.4 60.02 55.25 51.20
Ethiopia 37 29.2 25.5 23.81 21.91 19.98
Kenya 57 27.0 20.3 36.38 37.96 38.72
Rwanda 54 62.5 45.07 49.23 48.81
Somalia 13 12.4 36.5 47.52 48.12 40.08
Tanzania 50 25.4 18.8 27.93 28.39 28.24
Uganda 52 35.2 39.3 37.04 36.74 35.71
Southern Africa
Angola 64 62.6 56.6 37.50 39.38 42.34
Bostwana 36.2 23.0 19.61 18.08 16.65
Madagascar 36 23.6 36.0 32.59 31.67 30.98
Malawi 19 34.2 27.52 28.02 27.86
Mozambique 83 40.7 19.1 19.29 18.65 18.45
Namibia 30.3 40.5 19.29 41.05 42.06
South Africa 13 12.4 11.1 11.03 11.73 11.95
Swaziland 19.2 28.9 26.06 26.30 24.70
Zambia 35 23.5 35.7 29.75 30.79 30.71
Zimbabwe 50 31.8 32.6 32.85 33.78 33.92
Sources: For 1980 and 1990 data – United Nations (1991), United Nations Statistical Yearbook, Washington, DC: United Nations;
World Bank (1990), World Development Report, New York: Oxford University Press; Rondenelli (1983), Secondary Cities in Developing
Countries, Beverly Hills: Sage as cited by Aryeetey-Attoh (1997). For 2000 data – Population Division of the Department of Eco-
nomic and Social Aﬀairs of the United Nations Secretariat (2004). World Urbanization Prospects: The 2003 Revision. Data Set Name
(POP/DB/WUP/Rev.2003/Data set number/File number), data set in digital form. For 2001, 2005, and 2009 data – World Bank online
data available at http://data.worldbank.org. Retrieved on 2011-05-10.
40Table 2: Comparing the full sample means with the ssa and olm subsamples
Variable Full sample mean ssa subsample olm subsample
% of urban population in the largest city 32.16 38.45 33.22
Ratio of largest to second-largest city (WUP 2000) 4.10 4.24 4.61
Ratio of largest to second-largest city (DYB 2005) 3.20 3.33 3.40
Food expenditure share 29.06 43.18 35.44
Non-corruption index 3.94 2.79 2.98
Top income tax rate 33.09 39.38 32.66
Top corporate tax rate 29.86 34.18 31.01
Size of the shadow economy (% GDP) 35.31 43.70 41.04
Central government expenditures 39.54 60.23 46.20
41Table 3: Mean comparison tests between ssa and other groups of countries
ssa versus Mean comparison test p-value
% of urban population in the largest city
Industrial countries µssa > µIND 0.0002
Latin America & Caribbean µssa  = µLA 0.4794
East Asia, South Asia & Paciﬁc µssa > µAS 0.0027
Middle East & North Africa µssa > µNA 0.0306
ssa versus Mean comparison test p-value
Non-corruption index
Industrial countries µssa < µIND 0.0000
Latin America & Caribbean µssa < µLA 0.0188
East Asia, South Asia & Paciﬁc µssa < µAS 0.2446
Middle East & North Africa µssa < µNA 0.0005
ssa versus Mean comparison test p-value
Central government expenditures
Industrial countries µssa > µIND 0.0000
Latin America & Caribbean µssa > µLA 0.0001
East Asia, South Asia & Paciﬁc µssa > µAS 0.0028
Middle East & North Africa µssa > µNA 0.0638
Table 4: Pairwise correlation matrix
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(1) % of urban population in largest city 1.00
(2) Central government expenditures 0.4067∗ 1.00
(3) Food expenditure share 0.3142 0.5849∗ 1.00
(4) Non-corruption index -0.1784∗ -0.3726∗ -0.7601∗ 1.00
(5) Size of the shadow economy 0.2542∗ 0.3793∗ 0.6220∗ -0.6968∗ 1.00
(6) GDP per capita -0.1621∗ -0.3817∗ -0.8105∗ 0.8108∗ -0.6871∗ 1.00
Notes: Correlations with ∗ are signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
42Table 5: Dependent variable = primacy.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS FE MVREG 3SLS 3SLS
ln(urban pop) -0.0988∗∗ -0.1731∗∗ -0.2076∗∗ -0.2531∗∗ -0.3834∗∗
(0.0395) (0.0339) (0.0606) (0.0719) (0.0803)
Square of ln(urban pop) 0.0014 0.0040∗∗ 0.0049∗∗ 0.0052∗∗ 0.0082∗∗
(0.0013) (0.0012) (0.0021) (0.0025) (0.0028)
ln(GDPpc) -0.0003 0.1149∗∗ 0.0105
(0.0660) (0.0393) (0.0283)
Square of ln(GDPpc) 0.0001 -0.0075∗∗ -0.0011
(0.0041) (0.0025) (0.0017)
Democracy (prev. 5 years) -0.0003∗
(0.0002)
Protestant -0.0018∗∗ -0.0017∗∗ -0.0018∗∗ -0.0018∗∗
(0.0003) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006)
Muslim -0.0006∗∗ -0.0004 -0.0005 -0.0004
(0.0002) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0006)
Catholic -0.0008∗∗ -0.0007 -0.0007 -0.0003
(0.0002) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005)
Port city indicator 0.0085 0.0077 0.0053 0.0188
(0.0134) (0.0264) (0.0297) (0.0280)
Capital city indicator 0.0716∗∗ 0.0811∗∗ 0.0730∗∗ 0.0582∗
(0.0127) (0.0325) (0.0330) (0.0347)
ln(land area) -0.0077 -0.0162∗ -0.0080 0.0222∗∗
(0.0069) (0.0082) (0.0088) (0.0091)
Waterways/km2 0.9992 0.7031 0.5719 0.9966
(0.6152) (1.2998) (1.3954) (1.4187)
Railways/km2 -0.3322 -0.4163 -0.0902 0.1035
(0.3365) (0.5542) (0.7248) (0.6270)
Roadways/km2 0.0544∗∗ 0.0476∗ 0.0540∗ 0.0800∗∗
(0.0138) (0.0278) (0.0301) (0.0321)
% paved roads -0.0028∗∗ -0.0029∗∗ -0.0028∗∗ -0.0022∗∗
(0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005)
Ethnolinguistic fractionalization 0.0125 0.0145 0.0138 0.0058
(0.0263) (0.0691) (0.0749) (0.0769)
Corruption index 0.0010∗∗ 0.0013∗∗ 0.0016∗∗ 0.0003
(0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0007)
Corrup. Index*ssa dummy -0.0026∗∗ -0.0027∗∗ -0.0030∗∗ -0.0025∗∗
(0.0004) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0009)
Landlock dummy -0.0610∗∗ -0.0486 -0.0608∗∗ -0.0878∗∗
(0.0181) (0.0294) (0.0293) (0.0285)
French colonisation 0.0654∗∗ 0.0733∗ 0.0775∗ 0.0673
(0.0151) (0.0391) (0.0415) (0.0421)
English colonisation 0.0320∗∗ 0.0231 0.0256 0.0161
(0.0140) (0.0341) (0.0346) (0.0372)
Time dummies NO NO YES YES YES
N [countries] 403[70] 1197[205] 620[124] 585[117] 450[90]
R2 0.7188 0.5367
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis are Huber-White. Coeﬃcients with ∗∗ are signiﬁcant at
the 5% conﬁdence level, those with ∗ are signiﬁcant at the 10% conﬁdence level. Results in blue
are those of a GLS regression of ﬁrst step country average residuals on time-invariant variables.
43Table 6: Mean comparison tests between ssa and other groups of countries
ssa versus Mean comparison test p-value
Democracy index (Polity2)
Industrial countries µssa < µIND 0.0000
Latin America & Caribbean µssa < µLA 0.0000
East Asia & Paciﬁc µssa < µAS 0.0001
South Asia µssa < µAS 0.0241
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Figure 1: Corruption, central government expenditures, and urban primacy (ssa countries in red, the other
countries in black; simple ols regression lines)
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All panels are depicted with σ = 3, µ = 0.3, φ = 0.582, S = U = 10, β = 4, F = 1, m = 0.2. In the cases with positive taxes, we let tU = 0.01 and tS = 0.
Figure 2: ∆US∗ with (a) immobile unskilled labor and no taxes; (b) mobile unskilled labor and no taxes;

































All panels are depicted with σ = 3, µ = 0.3, φ = 0.51, S = U = 10, β = 4, F = 1, m = 0.2. We also set the tax rate for skilled to tS = 0.02.
Figure 3: Impacts of increasing unskilled taxation at the interior spatial equilibrium (0 < λS∗,λU∗ < 1)
















All panels are depicted with φ = 0.51, S = U = 10, β = 4, F = 1, m = 0.2. In panel (a) σ = 3, and in panel (b) µ = 0.3.
Figure 4: The equilibrium unskilled tax rate tU∗ as a function of the parameters σ and µ
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